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Child categorization
Susan A. Gelman∗ and Meredith Meyer
Categorization is a process that spans all of development, beginning in earliest
infancy yet changing as children’s knowledge and cognitive skills develop. In this
review article, we address three core issues regarding childhood categorization.
First, we discuss the extent to which early categories are rooted in perceptual
similarity versus knowledge-enriched theories. We argue for a composite
perspective in which categories are steeped in commonsense theories from a
young age but also are informed by low-level similarity and associative learning
cues. Second, we examine the role of language in early categorization. We
review evidence to suggest that language is a powerful means of expressing,
communicating, shaping, and supporting category knowledge. Finally, we consider
categories in context. We discuss sources of variability and flexibility in children’s
categories, as well as the ways in which children’s categories are used within
larger knowledge systems (e.g., to form analogies, make inferences, or construct
theories). Categorization is a process that is intrinsically tied to nearly all aspects
of cognition, and its study provides insight into cognitive development, broadly
construed.  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2011 2 95–105 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.96
INTRODUCTION
One of the primary means of organizingexperience is to categorize, by treating discrim-
inably different instances as alike. Categorization
takes place when an infant separates out carrots
from peas on her dinner plate; when a toddler says
‘doggie’ in the presence of dog pictures, toy dogs,
and the family pet; when a teenager decides which
classmates are ‘emos’, ‘jocks’, or ‘nerds’; and when
a chemist identifies the elements in a sample of rock.
Infants and young children spontaneously catego-
rize the world around them, in their unprompted
sorting behaviors,1 sequential touching and object-
examination responses,2 and visual or auditory
habituation patterns.3 Categorization is ubiquitous.
For adults and children alike, categories serve
two primary functions4: (1) they permit an efficient
means of storing and retrieving information, such
that we need not keep track of every individual item
we encounter and (2) they promote inferences that
extend knowledge beyond past experiences into the
future, allowing us to make predictions that guide
behavior. Understanding how items go together is
foundational to adaptive action and problem solving.
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Indeed, categorization or definitions are elements in
tests of intellectual functioning such as the WAIS.
The study of categorization in children is of
particular interest because categories are at the center
of core debates regarding the nature of thought and the
nature of development. Some of these debates include:
is there qualitative change in development? To what
extent are children’s categories built up from low-level
perceptual features versus informed by theories? Are
there innate concepts? To what extent are categories
constructed individually versus informed by cultural
input? Does language guide or determine thought?
Examining children’s categories is also revealing
about children’s developing belief systems across a
wide range of domains, including naı̈ve biology (e.g.,
living vs non-living), social reasoning (classifying
people by race, gender, personality traits, etc.), health
(which foods are nutritious), and so forth. In all
of these domains, cultural knowledge is embedded
in categories. For example, how children reason
about social relationships and in-groups versus out-
groups is deeply informed by studying the nature and
development of social categories, and is a timely topic
of great current interest.5
This brief review is organized into three main
sections. First, we address a central developmental
debate regarding the basis of children’s categoriza-
tion, namely, the extent to which early categories
are rooted in perceptual similarity versus knowledge-
enriched theories. We argue for a composite view in
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which categories are steeped in commonsense theories
from a young age but also are informed by low-level
similarity and associative learning cues. Second, we
examine the role of language in early categorization.
We review evidence to suggest that language is
a powerful means of expressing, communicating,
shaping, and supporting category knowledge. Finally,
we consider categories in context. We discuss sources
of variability and flexibility in children’s categories,
making the point that children can reveal very
different levels of competence depending on the task,
content, and context. Additionally, we briefly exam-
ine how categories are used within larger knowledge
systems (e.g., to form analogies, make inferences,
or construct theories). Throughout, our focus is
primarily on the period from roughly 2 years of age
(when children have begun to demonstrate expressive
language abilities) through elementary school, as this
is a period of rapid growth in categorization. The
period of infancy will be touched on only briefly, as
it goes beyond the scope of the present article.
WHAT IS THE BASIS OF CHILDREN’S
CATEGORIES?
A classic question for cognitive scientists is the
degree to which developmental change can be
characterized as continuous or discontinuous. This
question has received much debate within the area of
categorization. Certainly young children have much
less factual knowledge than older children and adults
(a quantitative difference), but the more controversial
question is whether there is qualitative change in
the structure, processes, or function of the categories
formed at different points in development.
Over the past two decades, persistent debate has
taken a somewhat different form: to what extent are
children’s categories based on available percepts alone
and to what extent do they also make use of deeper
sorts of information, such as causal and functional
cues? Adults’ categories do not reduce to perceptual
features alone; instead, they reflect domain-specific
knowledge and theories.6 For example, legless lizards
look remarkably like snakes yet are classified as
lizards based on the biological properties. More
generally, features that participate in causal theories
are weighted more heavily than features that are only
associated with other features, and features that are
causes are weighted more heavily than features that
are effects.7 Some researchers have proposed that
only adults possess theory-based categories, and that
in contrast, young children are limited to considering
salient perceptual features and linking them by means
of associative learning processes.8 In contrast, others
have argued that children’s categories incorporate
nonobvious, theory-based features from the start.9
In this section, we briefly review the evidence. The
position we endorse is that children’s categories make
use of both theories and similarity, from early in
development.
Similarity and Associative Learning Models
There are numerous ‘minimalist’ theories of early cat-
egorization, all resting on the idea that categorization
reflects low-level cues that are present in the environ-
ment. Similarity-based models propose that categories
are rooted in sensory and perceptual experiences
that are analyzed by means of general-purpose pro-
cesses alone (including associative learning, similarity
assessment, and attentional weighting).10,11 More-
over, higher level conceptual processes are unnec-
essary to account for children’s categorization skills.
Thus, for example, if a preschool child classifies an
item differently when it is labeled (‘See this bird?’) ver-
sus in a no-word control condition (‘See this?’), this is
because the word increases the similarity among the
objects receiving the same label.
Featural similarity and associative learning
appear to play important roles in children’s category
acquisition. For example, infants are sensitive to per-
ceptual similarity when forming categories of animals
and simple artifacts.12 Furthermore, associative learn-
ing strengthens the use of certain features over others.
Thus, children’s tendency to extend novel words on
the basis of shape more than other features such as
size, texture, or color, is strengthened by repeated
experiences with contexts that highlight shape and
associate same-shaped objects with a common label.13
Basic learning mechanisms enable the child to build
up a rich (but atheoretical) network of correlated
features, including labels. Infants as well as adults
are sensitive to the statistical patterns characterizing
cross-situational word and reference co-occurrences
and can put this learning to use in learning correct
mappings.14 This impressive capacity to track word-
referent associations across time is proposed as one
possible mechanism to explain seemingly ‘smart’ word
learning behaviors such as fast-mapping.15,16
Theory-Based Models
Theory-based models differ from similarity and asso-
ciative learning models in proposing that children’s
categories are informed by factors beyond immediate
sensory or perceptual cues and/or past associations.
Theory-based models do not deny the importance
of similarity and associative learning in children’s
representations,17 but propose that such features are
predictive of ‘deeper’ similarities. Thus, for example,
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young children display a powerful bias to attend to
shape,13 yet if shape is placed in competition with
intended function (e.g., two objects have the same
shape but different intended functions), then 3-year
olds no longer display a shape bias.18 Similarly, even
2-year-olds categorize objects based on functional fea-
tures that conflict with surface appearances, as long as
the functions are plausible and distinctive.19,20 Like-
wise, 3- and 4-year olds categorize objects based on
causal features, as long as the causal links are clearly
and consistently demonstrated.21,22
Indeed, causal links can even override perceptual
similarity, such that children provide two identical
items with distinct labels, if their causal consequences
differ.23 For example, if one block makes a machine
light up but then an identical block has no effect,
preschool children explain inconsistent effects by
relabeling items, for example, ‘It looks like a toma,
but it’s not. It’s not really a toma at all’ (Figure 1).
The ability to link labels to causal effects is in place in
early preschool24 but also become more sophisticated
throughout the preschool years.22
Theory-based models also predict that categories
will be sensitive to the domain in which objects
appear. Thus, for example, preschoolers attend more
to color in classifying foods than artifacts, because
color is more predictive in the domain of food
(e.g., carrots and parsnips can be distinguished by
color, whereas shirts or cars can be any color).25
Likewise, 2- and 3-year olds attend more to texture
in classifying animals than artifacts, because the
presence of, for instance, fur versus feathers has
important functional consequences.26 A recurring
debate is whether these patterns are the result of
associative learning patterns or reflect an appreciation
for causal implications.13 Evidence for the latter is that
domain-specific categorization can be cued by non-
perceptual cues (namely, vignettes that make reference
to relevant conceptual features, such as animacy),
and that children show domain-specificity as early as
18–22 months of age, before they have acquired the
associated vocabulary that is argued to be the basis of
the distinction, on the associative learning account.26
One idea that has been proposed to account for
children’s use of nonobvious features in categoriza-
tion is psychological essentialism.9,27 On this view,
children and adults have a belief that certain cate-
gories are real (not human constructs), unchanging
(not flexible), have a ‘deeper’ basis (not superficial),
and hidden quality (essence) that causes observable
features. This hidden quality is often not even spec-
ified or known, but rather is a ‘placeholder’ that
is assumed to exist, even if the details are unknown.
Essentialism posits that people have an abstract, skele-
tal set of expectations concerning how categories are
structured and function, even before the particulars
are filled in—a position that is consistent with other
views of early cognition as consisting of broad general
expectations.28 Thus, for example, children’s cate-
gories are not an attempt to capture perceptual com-
monalities, but rather an expectation that any such
surface commonality is a reflection of a deeper basis.
Essentialism entails treating a category as
consisting of more than its surface features. This
includes treating categories as: immutable, possessing
sharp boundaries, possessing innate potential, and
FIGURE 1 | Approximately 50% of 4- and
5-year olds spontaneously provided labels
based on the causal features of the blocks
rather than the perceptual features of the
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fostering rich inductive inferences.9 Because children
are dependent on expert knowledge to guide them
to the appropriate classification (e.g., is a whale a
fish or a mammal?), labels are an important source
of information to children’s categories. As young as
13 months of age, children make use of adult-supplied
labels to modify category boundaries and draw novel
inferences. For example, a child learning about a
behavior of a typical bird is likely to infer that this
property is also true of a perceptually similar bird-
like dinosaur (a pterodactyl) but not of a perceptually
atypical bird (a dodo). However, once an adult labels
these items (the pterodactyl is labeled ‘dinosaur’, and
the dodo is labeled ‘bird’), children are more likely to
extend the property to the other ‘bird’ (dodo) rather
than the ‘dinosaur’ (Figure 2).29–31 Similarity-based
theorists propose that these category-based inferences
are due to similarity rather than essentialism. On
their view, the label itself makes items from the same
category more similar to one another (i.e., the auditory
cues adjust the perceptual similarity relations among
the items being considered11). In contrast, the theory-
based position notes several aspects of the findings that
the similarity-based model cannot accommodate.17
First, children do not display a general pattern
in which all labels are privileged. Instead, they are
sensitive to different kinds of words (e.g., nouns vs
verbs; labels for animals vs artifacts), each linked to
a different kind of concept (e.g., categories of objects
vs events), reflecting children’s sensitivity to the
conceptually motivated use of the labels.17 Second,
word-meanings incorporate a variety of abstract
conceptual features, including ‘intention’, ‘cause’,
and ‘animacy’, as well as sensory and perceptual
features.32 Third, words refer to concepts, they do
not merely associate to entities in the environment.
A compelling demonstration of this point is that by
18 months of age, children who learn a novel word
(e.g., ‘whisk’) in reference to a picture immediately
TARGET "BIRD" ATYPICAL "BIRD" ATYPICAL (BIRD-
LIKE) "DINOSAUR"
FIGURE 2 | Preschool children who learn a new fact about the
target bird are more likely to generalize that fact to an atypical bird
than to a pterodactyl, indicating that the category label can be more
important than outward appearances in children’s inductive inferences
(reprinted with permission from Ref 29. Copyright 1990 American
Psychological Association).
and preferentially extend the word to the actual
object that the picture refers to Ref 33. If words were
mere associations, then a word linked to a picture
should extend mostly (or only) to other pictures.
A fourth and final point is that words acquire
their meaning not only from their histories of co-
occurrence with entities in the world, but also from
the intricate linguistic and social systems of which
they are a part.34,35 When mapping a meaning onto a
word, children take into account morphological struc-
ture, grammatical context, and a host of social cues,
including the speaker’s eye-gaze, trustworthiness, and
intentionality. Young children do not automatically
map words onto co-occurring objects, and make use of
information such as speaker intent.36 Further evidence
for this point is that when social reasoning is impaired,
as with autism spectrum disorder, children have diffi-
culty correctly mapping a word onto its referent.37,38
ROLE OF LANGUAGE
IN CATEGORIZATION
As is evident from several of the examples discussed
above, the study of categorization is closely linked
to the study of language. More generally, this point
is apparent in at least three distinct ways. First, the
words that children learn imply a vast set of underlying
categories; with every utterance of dog, run, or up,
children demonstrate that they have formed categories
to which these words refer. Children’s language, then,
can provide us at least partial access to their categories
and in the process shed light on the mechanisms that
underlie category acquisition.
Second, language serves as an important vehicle
for transmitting category-relevant information.
Although much of the literature focuses on children as
solitary learners, inventing or discovering categories
on their own,39 we also know that categories are
deeply informed by social and cultural input.40 The
language provided by parents and knowledgeable
others conveys information that extends well beyond
the immediately perceptible world.41–43 Third,
language provides a means of referring directly to
categories in their entirety, as is seen in the use of
abstract kind-referring noun phrases, or generics (e.g.,
Birds in Birds lay eggs). It is very difficult—perhaps
impossible—to convey categories as a whole in the
absence of language.
In this section, we discuss two interrelated
questions that arise when considering the close
link between language and categorization. First, we
consider whether and how language may affect the
categories children form. We then focus on generics
both as a window on children’s categories and a source
of information to children regarding categories.
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Effects of Language on Children’s Categories
The idea that language might exert a causal influence
on categorization has experienced a recent resur-
gence, with focus on the Whorfian claim that different
languages lead to different modes of thought.44 Even
early on, language influences children’s individuation
and categorization of objects. Xu and colleagues find
that labeling promotes children’s ability to recognize
objects as distinct entities through space and time.45
Further, well before any linguistic production of
their own, infants are more likely to treat a set of
identically labeled objects as similar (e.g., a series
of rabbits) in comparison to the same set of objects
presented without labels or with a non-linguistic
sound, and to display a heightened novelty preference
when exposed to an exemplar outside the original
category (e.g., a pig).46
Labels also appear to license inductions beyond
those afforded by visible perceptual features. For
instance, infants expect objects that receive the same
label to share nonobvious properties (such as a sound
produced by an internal part), even if those objects are
perceptually dissimilar31 (Figure 3). Further, infants
even expect perceptually identical objects to have
dissimilar nonobvious functions if they receive con-
trasting labels.32 The capacity for language to redirect
attention beyond immediately perceptible attributes
continues to affect older children’s categories as well.
For example, as noted in the previous section on
theory-based models of categorization, providing a
common label to perceptually dissimilar objects (e.g., a
blackbird and a flamingo) invites preschool-aged chil-
dren to generalize behaviors and traits across these
instances,34 and providing a label to an ambiguous
exemplar (e.g., calling a spoon-like key a ‘spoon’) pro-
motes inferences that are consistent with the labeled
category (e.g., using the object to eat).30
Thus, across development, language allows
children to go beyond the perceptual in their
categorical reasoning. In this way, labels appear to
direct children to assume deeper similarities among the
named instances and to make inferences that may not
be consistent with immediately perceptual attributes.
What are the mechanisms that underlie such effects?
One possibility is that the act of labeling something
implies the existence of an inferentially rich category to
which that labeled entity belongs. Labels are argued
to hold a privileged role in guiding category-based
induction, licensing children to seek out deeper, kind-
based similarities.9 This is not to say that language
is the only means of constructing non-perceptual
categories, but rather that children can be (and
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FIGURE 3 | (a) Sample item set. (b) Frequency with which 13-month
olds perform target action (e.g., rattle) as a function of similarity to the
target and same or different label from the target (reprinted with
permission from Ref 31. Copyright 2004 Wiley-Blackwell).
Labeling may also have profound impact on
children’s judgments within the social world. For
example, Gelman and Heyman47 found that 5- and
8-year-old children were more likely to attribute
stability to someone’s behavior if it was presented
with a noun label (e.g., Rose is a carrot-eater) as
opposed to described in a predicate (e.g., Rose eats
carrots whenever she can). Heyman48 demonstrated
that this effect extends into children’s judgments
of academic skill as well; when elementary-school-
aged children heard a character described as a math
whiz, for example, they attributed more stability and
innateness to the character’s math ability than if they
heard that the character did the best on a math test.
Relatedly, Cimpian et al.49 investigated how different
ways of describing talent affected younger children’s
motivation to persevere in the face of failure. After
hearing a fictional scenario in which talent was
conveyed with a label (e.g., You are a good drawer)
in comparison to a predicate (e.g., You did a good
job drawing), 4-year-old children were less likely to
report that they would want to continue on a drawing
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task after making a mistake. Further, hearing about
ability predicated of a broad category as opposed to an
individual has implications for children’s motivations,
suggesting that labels referring to categories are
effective in conveying the idea that talent may be
inherent to a category and hence more central and
immutable.50 Taken together, this line of studies
suggests that noun labels signal the existence of a well-
structured, inferentially rich category (e.g., carrot-
eater, math whiz, good drawer), thereby providing
stronger license than predicate-based information for
attributions of stability and inherence of traits and
behaviors. More generally, adults’ labeling of social
groups conveys that discrete kinds of people exist,
with these groups united by internal and stable traits;
in this way, children’s sensitivity to adults’ labeling
styles shapes their processing of the social world.51
Generic Nouns
As noted earlier, generic noun phrases (hereafter
generics) are linguistic forms that refer to categories
rather than particular instances.52 For example, the
generic birds in Birds lay eggs can be interpreted as
‘the kind of thing known as a bird’; in contrast, a
particular noun phrase refers to a specific instance or
subset of the kind, as in My birds laid eggs. Generics
express a unique type of information, indicating that
a property is characteristic of the category but not
necessarily universal or even statistically the most
prevalent—the statement Birds lay eggs is considered
true despite the fact that male and juvenile birds
(which together clearly constitute the majority of all
birds) do not lay eggs.53
Generics may be a uniquely effective means
of expressing categorical knowledge consistent with
essentialist reasoning. The idea that Birds lay eggs,
for instance, may suggest not just that many birds lay
eggs (i.e., that the property takes broad scope) but
also that there is something inherent or essential to
the bird category such that they lay eggs. The very
fact that birds as a category receives the generic label
thus allows for more inductive generalizations and
judgments that go beyond any related to egg-laying;
one might also expect a range of similar behaviors,
properties, and traits to characterize birds as a group.
When considering the role of generics in chil-
dren’s essentialist beliefs about categories, one initial
question is whether children are even sensitive to the
means by which generics are expressed linguistically.
A growing body of evidence strongly suggests that the
answer is yes. Overt surface form differences between
generic and particular noun phrases can be quite subtle
(e.g., compare ‘Birds lay eggs’ to ‘The birds lay eggs’),
and there is no single unambiguous syntactic marker
of generics.52 Nonetheless, children recognize many
of the conventional linguistic devices used to express
generics and can integrate their syntactic knowledge
with considerations of semantic and pragmatic cues
to arrive at adult-like interpretations.54,55
There is also support for the role of generics
in promoting judgments consistent with essentialist
reasoning. Preschool-aged children expect that prop-
erties predicated of generics are more central to a
given noun category,56 and are more likely to use a
property rather than overall similarity as a basis for
categorization when told that the property is true of
the generic (e.g., Keftas have humps) as opposed to an
individual (e.g., This kefta has humps)57 (Figure 4).
Children are also more likely to expect a property to
have a more internal or causal basis after hearing the
property expressed generically, and this effect holds
for both social (e.g., gender) and non-social (e.g.,
animal) categories.58
Children’s use of generics can reflect essentialism
as well. Acquired early and by children in every
language studied (even including home sign systems of
deaf children), generics appear as a ubiquitous means





FIGURE 4 | Children who hear ‘kevtas are woolly’ are more likely to
select the differently shaped woolly item as a kevta rather than the
same-shaped non-woolly item (reprinted with permission from Ref 57.
Copyright 2008 American Psychological Association).
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and children, generics are more often used to refer to
natural kinds (e.g., animals) as opposed to artifacts
(e.g., machines).59 This difference is consistent with
the past research demonstrating that children expect
natural kind categories to be more stable and
inferentially rich60 and provides indirect support for
the role of generics in essentialist reasoning.
The exact nature of this role, however, is
still unclear. One possibility is that parents’ own
tendency to use generics to refer to natural kinds is
the sole source of differences in children, with any
distinctions in kind-based reasoning across domains
being a consequence of the input children receive.
Such an explanation would be consistent with a
unidirectional relationship between language and
concept; without generics as a linguistic form, there
would be no generic concept. We do not favor such
a position, however. Although parents’ generics may
have the capacity to inform children about category
structure, children’s essentialist reasoning itself is an
early-developed form of thinking.9
CATEGORIES IN CONTEXT
Categories are significant not only as representations
in their own right, but also for how they link to other
cognitive processes. Murphy refers to the representa-
tion of categories as ‘a kind of mental glue’, linking
current perception to past experience; linking current
experience to knowledge, theories, and imagination;
enabling novel inferences; and mediating the relation-
ship between language and reality.6 For example, the
category ‘tree’ allows you to relate the tree in your yard
to prior trees you have seen, to access your knowledge
about trees, to generalize facts learned about one tree
to other trees, and to interpret the English word ‘tree’
in a meaningful way. Thus, categories have implica-
tions for nearly every aspect of cognition. In this sense,
categories can never be considered isolated represen-
tations, but are woven into the fabric of thought.
In this section, we consider two ways in which
children’s categories fit within a broader context. First,
we outline ways in which the goals, context, and
content of categories lead to variability and flexibility.
Second, we consider how children combine categories
into larger knowledge systems.
Sources of Variability and Flexibility
A powerful theme throughout the developmental
categorization literature is that children’s categories
are highly varied and do not conform to a single,
monolithic pattern, at any point in development.
By preschool age (and often earlier), children can
categorize based on shape, color, texture, num-
ber, gender, facial features, speech, musical tones,
movement patterns, broad ontological information
(such as animacy), nonobvious information (such
as internal parts), and more.3 Children’s categories
include highly contextually sensitive groupings as
well as broad, context-free groupings. They are both
abstract and concrete. They reflect subtle statistical
cues as well as powerful theories. They are linked
to language and independent of language. They are
highly flexible. In short, they display much of the
range and flexibility of adult categories.61 Indeed,
this variability partly accounts for the contrasting
theoretical positions outlined earlier, as typically the
selection of category and task differs, depending on
whether one is interested in, for example, the role of
causal knowledge or the influence of shape.
One way to think about the variation in
children’s categories is to consider that categorization
entails choice: consciously or not, the categorizer
chooses a perspective on the world. Any item could be
categorized in a countless variety of ways, but at any
given moment, the child focuses on no more than one
or two. At times, this choice reflects a categorization
goal: Do I strive for a rapid categorization even if it
includes errors, or do I strive for the most thoughtful
and informed categorization even if it slows me
down? At other times, this choice reflects the category
domain, context, or task at hand. Some have argued
that this variability suggests that concepts do not exist
as stable entities.62 Others propose that it is a mistake
to pursue a single theory of concepts.63 Regardless
of these broader theoretical implications, for current
purposes, we note that variability in categorization is
clearly systematic.
Some of the factors that influence children’s
categorization decisions involve the task itself. Being
asked to sort objects leads preschool children to
use different information than being asked to form
inductive inferences.64 Framing the task as one that is
teacher-led (pedagogical) leads 5- and 6-year-old chil-
dren to make greater use of properties of the sample
than when the task is framed as learner-driven (non-
pedagogical).65 Implicit and explicit categorization
tasks can lead to diverging results, though this depends
somewhat on the age of the participant.66 Further, as
detailed earlier, providing labels also exerts powerful
effects on preschool children’s categorization.16
Other factors concern the nature of the items
being classified. Certainly, an array of simple geo-
metric shapes will encourage a focus on perceptual
features, whereas an array of animals will permit con-
sideration of other features (such as genetic related-
ness, environmental match). More generally, different
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domains (e.g., animals vs artifacts) encourage different
modes of categorization.26,59,67 Pictures differ from
objects in the kinds of categories they encourage, such
that parent–child conversations about pictures focus
relatively more on taxonomic categories, whereas
parent–child conversations about objects focus rela-
tively more on thematic relations.68 Children are also
faster at processing functional relations as opposed to
perceptual similarity relations for objects that can be
manipulated (e.g., tools), but the reverse holds true for
objects that cannot be manipulated (e.g., furniture).69
Currently, the findings of task and item effects
are scattered, and there is not yet a coherent, integra-
tive model for the factors that lead to different kinds
of categorization at different points in development.
This will be an important goal for future research.
Categories in Larger Systems
To this point, we have focused on categories as
atomic entities; how does the child form a category
of ‘bird’, ‘cup’, or ‘whisk’? Yet individual categories
can be compared, combined, and contrasted, in order
to extend and develop one’s knowledge. For adults,
categories play an important role as components of
larger knowledge systems. Evolutionary theory entails
noting and testing hypothesized genetic relationships
among categories that might at first appear unrelated
(e.g., birds and dinosaurs). Analogical reasoning is the
basis of much creative scientific thought, and requires
forming new and unexpected comparisons among
categories.70 Generalizing new facts often requires
assessing the breadth of categories that instantiate that
new fact (e.g., what is the likelihood that one’s pet will
contract a certain disease, given that both humans and
squirrels do so?). These examples illustrate that much
of the important work of categories is carried out in
the context of larger systems in which they participate.
There is an extensive literature on how children
combine categories to note taxonomic relations (e.g.,
birds and crocodiles are both animals), thematic
relations (e.g., birds live in nests), and slot-filler
relations (e.g., oatmeal and bacon are both breakfast
foods).71 Although it was once believed that different
relations were characteristic of distinct developmental
stages,72 it is now recognized that category relations
are highly flexible from as early as preschool age.
Children and adults alike can classify based on
taxonomic or thematic links, depending on the
properties of the task and item.16,73,74
Children are also capable of comparing and
contrasting categories, from preschool age. For exam-
ple, as noted earlier, categories are elements in naı̈ve
theories, and a category such as ‘girl’ differs impor-
tantly from a category such as ‘rock’ in that only the
former is part of a theory of intentional action.75–77
However, the manner in which children combine cat-
egories changes with development. Theory change in
childhood provides a potent example, for as children’s
theories change, the component categories are forced
to change as well. Thus, for example, classification
of what is ‘alive’ is influenced by changing theories of
biology—as well as cultural and linguistic factors.78,79
Information gleaned from multiple categories
also guides children’s inductive inferences.80 For
example, 8-year-old children are more likely to infer
that all animals possess a property that they learn is
true of goats and sheep than to infer that all animals
possess a property that they learn is true of sheep.81
However, this capacity, too, undergoes marked
developmental change. Adults draw more extensive
inferences regarding properties they learn to be true
of a diverse sample of categories than regarding
properties they learn to be true of a homogeneous
sample of categories (e.g., a property learned about
a horse and a rabbit generalizes further than a
property learned about a horse and a zebra;82). In
contrast, children below middle childhood do not yet
appreciate the importance of sample diversity and
instead rely on characteristics of individual instances,
such as their typicality (e.g., drawing more inferences
from sparrows to other birds than from owls to other
birds;80). Interestingly, even much younger children
can make use of category sampling information in
certain kinds of learning contexts, though not when
asked to evaluate competing sources of evidence.83
Categories are also fruitfully combined to
generate comparisons, which permit extraction of
more abstract properties than when considering just
a single category. Thus, for example, when given
individual pictures, children prefer to sort based on
perceptual similarity (e.g., grouping an apple with a
balloon rather than a banana), yet when provided
with exemplars from two categories (apple and pear),
thus permitting featural comparison, children now
classify based on taxonomic relatedness (grouping the
apple and pear with a banana more often than with a
balloon).84 A similar effect can be found when children
are asked to compare two categories as compared to
two individual instances (e.g., ‘Can you tell me some
things that are the same about dogs and cats?’ vs ‘Can
you tell me some things that are the same about this
dog and this cat?’).85 Children are more apt to focus
on superficial or spurious features when comparing
individuals (‘They are both brown’), and to focus
on less obvious features when comparing categories
(‘They are both animals’).
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Although more research is needed to examine
the developmental roots and consequences of these
abilities, children’s capacity to combine and compare
categories illustrates that from an early age, categories
play a role in all aspects of human cognition.6
CONCLUSION
Categorization is a component of a vast range of
cognitive processes. As such, the study of catego-
rization in children is linked to the study of cogni-
tive development more broadly. In this review, we
have highlighted the importance of domain-specific
knowledge structures for categorization, the role of
language in children’s concepts, and the complexity,
variability, and broader impact of categories for intel-
ligent thought. Some exciting directions for the future
include mapping out children’s categories in particu-
lar domains (e.g., social cognition), determining the
mechanisms that underlie category learning at differ-
ent points in development, studying how sensitivity
to cues in the input interact with children’s causal
understanding and naı̈ve theories, and determining
how language interacts with these processes.
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Shafir E. Category-based induction. Psych Rev 1990,
97:185–200.
83. Xu F, Tenenbaum JB. Word learning as Bayesian infer-
ence. Psychol Rev 2007, 114:245–272.
84. Namy LL, Gentner D. Making a silk purse out of
two sows’ ears: young children’s use of comparison in
category learning. J Exp Psychol Gen 2002, 131:5–15.
85. Gelman SA, Raman L, Gentner D. Effects of language
and similarity on comparison processing. Lang Learn
Dev 2009, 5:147–171.
Volume 2, January /February 2011  2010 John Wiley & Sons, L td. 105
